This commentary on the Israeli election campaign is as good as any. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/world/middleeast/07israel.html?hp
Those interviewed note that ideology is no longer a feature of Israeli politics; that voters have moved toward the center; that no one has a clear idea how to respond to the confused regional realities; and that Avigdor Lieberman has emerged as the star of the campaign, partly by latching on to anti-establishment sentiments.
My explanations for those descriptions:
First, ideology is the stuff of simple and clear postures that indicate how to deal with specific problems. The prominent ideologies are those which define you on the side of socialism or free enterprise, and those which maximize compromise with international neighbors or emphasize the glories of one's own nation.
Second, the pressing issues that Israel faces are as fluid as they are unpleasant. Ideology does not work when needs are unclear. The need here is how to settle a dispute of a century or more with Palestinians and other Arabs when there is so much diversity among the Arabs, and each segment that Israel might negotiate with is hampered by a fear of what the others will do. When Ehud Barak was prime minister he offered Yassir Arafat a large portion of what he wanted, and withdrew Israeli forces from Lebanon. Those actions produced Arab violence at home, and led to the 2006 war in Lebanon. Ariel Sharon withdrew settlements from Gaza, which heightened rocket attacks on southern Israel and produced you know what. Or maybe nobody knows what it produced. We have all seen the destruction in Gaza. None of us have seen what will result from it.
Third, the economic ideologies have been muted in Israel and elsewhere throughout the West. Most of us know the problems of socialism, and recent months have shows the faults of free enterprise.
Fourth, economic ideologies are little more than decorations when a national economy is small and dependent on the need to export and import much of what it produces and consumes. Local politicians can posture all they want about the classic issues of ownership, regulation, distribution, the national budget, and social services. Much of what happens depends on how much the Europeans and Americans buy from Israeli high tech components and services, diamonds, fruits and vegetables, and the prices of imported energy, grains, other raw materials, and consumer goods.
Fifth, Israeli politics is usually a scene of the same old faces that have been around for years. Voters have never chosen a party headed by someone like Jimmy Carter or Barack Obama. Those elected have climbed through the ranks of national politics. Even relatively new faces, like Amnon Mitzna, chosen to head the Labor Party for the election of 2003, or Amir Peretz, chosen to head Labor for the election of 2006, came from positions as the mayor of Haifa, Israel's third largest city, or as head of the Labor Federation. Neither led their party to an election victory.
Sixth, a familiarity with personality takes the place of ideology. Voters can assess how the leaders of each party are likely to respond to what they see on the horizon. As noted above, however, the horizon is blurred and fluid. This puts a premium on generalized likes or dislikes of known candidates, rather than any clear notion of how each will deal with whatever happens.
Seventh, no Israeli party has ever won a majority in a national election. All "winning" parties have to cobble together a coalition. None of the parties in this election seems likely to win more than a quarter of the seats in the Knesset. The political competitors of today will sit together over the course of the next government. We can expect that many of their meetings will be contentious.
What all this means is that some of the same old people will be dealing with Israel's problems. The voters and politicians are familiar with the problems defined in general terms, like security in the face of Arab threats, or economic fragility. No one knows just how these and other issues will play out from sources outside of Israel's borders. As a result, the premium for whoever leads the next government will be on flexibility, pragmatism, avoiding dangerous adventures, and coping with what happens.
From what we know about the major candidates, they all know this, and have proven themselves capable. Neither we, nor they, know what they will be doing a week after one of them forms a government. We know even less what they will be doing a month or a year later, in circumstances that we cannot predict in detail.
Given all of this, no one should be surprised that the candidates are emphasizing their own personalities and (negatively) those of their rivals. This campaign would be strange, indeed, if it sounded like a seminar on socialism, free enterprise, peace at any price, or strident nationalism.
Avigdor Lieberman is the outlier. He poses more than others as the man who knows the answers, and is not afraid to express them. His emphasis is on the disloyalty of Israeli Arabs, and an even more forceful posture toward the enemies outside of Israel. Much of his support comes from Russian-speaking Israelis, and from others who want a strong and decisive leader who will deal with unresolved problems of national security. The latest polls show him winning as many as 18 seats, which would make his party the third largest in the Knesset.
Coping with Lieberman, as well as coping with whatever happens among the Arabs and in the world economy, is what the next government will be doing.
I welcome comments sent to my e-mail address below.
Ira Sharkansky (Emeritus)
Dept of Political Science
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
msira@mscc.huji.ac.il
Tel: +972-2-532-2725
Fax: +972-2-582-9144