It is early and presumptuous to call the operation in Gaza a defining moment in the history of Israel and Palestinians, but it might be that. The number of Palestinian casualties are, for the days involved, greater than at any time since 1967 or 1948.
Some wish that it will facilitate the peace process. By this view, a weakening of Hamas will remove a primary impediment to agreement. It will add to the capacity of the moderate Mahmoud Abbas to represent all of Palestine and move ahead in conversations with whoever wins the Israeli election.
Against this optimism, there are several points of skepticism.
*As best as we can tell on the basis of occasional reports from closed conversations, Abbas and Olmert never approached an agreement on the key issues of territory, Jerusalem, or Palestinians refugees.
*Abbas' condemnation of Israel may be more than lip service. Extensive destruction and many casualties, plus angry demonstrations among Israeli Arabs and the Muslims of the Middle East, Europe, and North America echo in the West Bank.
*There are Gazans, as well as Muslims in the West Bank and elsewhere who view Abbas as a traitor for dealing with Israel, and not coming to the aid of Gaza. That he has nothing substantial to offer Gaza will not lessen the antagonism toward him.
*Extremists of Gaza, perhaps a higher proportion of its population after the operation, will remain a problem for any negotiations between Israel and Palestinians.
*Palestinians will find it difficult to accept an agreement as legitimate if it does not include Gaza as well as the West Bank.
*Abbas' term as president formally ends in a matter of days. Prior to the operation in Gaza, there was speculation about extending his term. The problems caused by Gaza might present the opportunity for the Palestinians to replace him with someone who can make a fresh start toward the future of Palestine. To date, there is no obvious replacement who can make such a claim, and appears to have wide support.
*More likely is a period of chaos as the Palestinians chew over the implications of Gaza and see how foreign powers express themselves.
*The practice among Palestinians is to cope with their numerous factions by extensive negotiations, occasionally with loud recriminations and violence. The groups that have been moderate toward Israel will have a difficult time persuading those pushed even further toward extremism by recent events. Whatever happens will not occur quickly.
*It is not only the Palestinians troubled by Hamas and Gaza. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf States see threats to themselves in the extremism that Iran promotes. They have not applauded the Israelis' operation, but some of their spokesmen have blamed Hamas for bringing it on themselves.
*What this does for "Arab unity" is yet to be seen. Early signs are that the Arab League can still host speakers who condemn Israel, but not reach any declarations that raise above platitudes.
By this analysis, Gaza will close the window of opportunity seen earlier by the Bush administration and others. Israel may be more secure due to what it is doing to Hamas. It may advance the cause of peace in the long run by showing the price of Palestinian extremism. Short run prospects are bleak.
Two of the major actors in the Gaza operation, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Defense Minister Ehud Barak, had identified themselves with a posture of accommodation. Olmert soldiered on in talks with Mahmoud Abbas despite investigations on several charges of corruption. Time and again he announced progress, and repeated his commitment to reaching at least a partial agreement. When Barak was prime minister in 2000, he made far reaching offers to Yassir Arafat. Barak left politics when he lost the election of 2001 to Ariel Sharon. He returned to win a Labor Party election of leadership in 2007. Among the major Israeli parties, Labor's parliamentarians are the most outspoken in promoting significant concessions in order to reach agreement with the Palestinians.
Olmert and Barak did not pursue the Gaza operation in order to scuttle negotiations with the Palestinians. Hamas and its allies pushed them to prepare for a confrontation by persistent smuggling of weapons and--except for a lull of six months--continuous firing of rockets into Israel since 2001. The final decision to attack came when Gazans fired more than 80 missiles and mortar shells against Israel on December 24th.
Before deciding whether Gaza will be a landmark or a passing occurrence, it is wise to recall some other events that achieved headlines.
*The Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 assembled Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians, and Lebanese, under an umbrella provided by the United States, the European Union, the USSR, and Egypt.
*The Oslo Accords of 1993 involved a mutual recognition of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and seemed to open a road toward two states living at peace.
*The Hebron Agreement in 1997 and the Wye River Memorandum of 1998 produced redeployments of Israeli forces in the West Bank, as further steps under the Oslo Accords.
*The Camp David Summit in 2000, when delegations led by Ehud Barak and Yassir Arafat met with President Bill Clinton, seemed to come as close as ever to a comprehensive agreement.
Equally important were the intifadas that began in 1987 and 2000. The latter was especially destructive, claiming 1,100 Israeli lives and more than three times the number of Palestinians. It is widely cited as reversing what began at Madrid and Oslo.
The Bush administration, together with the Russians, the United Nations, and the European Community sought to replace violence with peace. Some commentators said that they hoped to produce a Palestinian State in order to overcome problems with Muslims associated with 9/11, and subsequent American fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Their landmarks were the Road Map to Peace in 2002, and the Annapolis Conference of 2007.
Landmarks or forgettable?
After January 20th it will be the turn of Barack Obama. The Middle East is not the only issue on his agenda. Continuing efforts to revive the economy may be more pressing. Also on his table will be domestic initiatives featured in his campaign, as well as Iraq and Afghanistan.
If you have anything left after disappointments from the stock market, real estate, and Bernie Madoff, it would not be wise to bet it on the early creation of a Palestinian State.
I welcome comments sent to my e-mail address below.
Ira Sharkansky (Emeritus)
Dept of Political Science
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
msira@mscc.huji.ac.il
Tel: +972-2-532-2725
Fax: +972-2-582-9144