The issue of Gaza has returned to Israel's agenda. The reason? What may be the expiration in the next few days of the "period of calm."
"May be" is part of the problem. There is no clear end date, recognized by all parties, just as there is no clear specification as to what is permitted and forbidden in the period of calm.
Hamas officials cannot talk directly to Israeli officials, because Hamas does not recognize Israel's right to exist. Israeli officials cannot talk directly to Hamas officials because Israel has declared that Hamas is a terrorist organization beyond the pale.
The result is that discussions are indirect, largely via Egyptian intermediaries, or even more vaguely one-sided. Each declares what it thinks the period of calm ought to include, and when it is meant to expire. Some of those declarations vary from one announcement to another. They may carry some weight even while the other side declares a different set of assumptions.
A recipe for ambiguity or confusion? You bet. But it is the best attainable under the circumstances.
The fogginess of the situation also permits latitude in each side's behavior. In recent weeks there have been daily firings of rockets and mortars toward Israel. Israel has responded, but not in a massive way and not in response to each cluster of firings. Israeli soldiers have fired upon suspicious people approaching the border, or looking as if they are getting ready to fire missiles, or looking as if they have just fired missiles. Israel has also cut down on the food, fuel, and other supplies going into Gaza from the points of entry that it controls.
Who is violating the agreement about a period of calm? Whose violations are legitimate responses to the violations of the other side?
In a setting of ambiguity, there are no clear answers.
Another puzzle concerns the lack of damage done by recent missiles. It appears that a larger incidence than in past have fallen into empty fields, or have not even made it out of Gaza's airspace. Perhaps the pressure of perpetual Israeli surveillance has limited the capacity of Palestinians to concentrate on the work of setting up, aiming, and firing. Or perhaps Hamas and its friends do not want to provoke Israel into serious retaliation. They may be firing rockets aimed away from population centers only to satisfy activists who want to do something against the Zionist enemy.
The fog of this demi-war is thick.
So is the fog surrounding Israeli policymaking. Israelis in and outside of the government, as well as ranking officers of the IDF and overseas friends have called for a serious response to the rockets and mortars. They are intolerable, as is Hamas' continued importation of munitions through tunnels to Egypt. The solutions range from an all-out invasion, complete cutting of the electricity, water, food, and fuel that passes from Israel to Gaza, to more focused attacks on the Hamas leadership, workshops, arsenals, and activists.
Against these comments are those from other Israelis in and outside of the government, including ranking officials of the IDF, and overseas friends. They recite the reasons for respecting the period of calm, and allowing it to continue beyond its amorphous end date.
Among the arguments against a significant escalation is that important members of the international community (read that the American president and a small number of key Europeans) would have difficulty accepting a major Israeli onslaught, or significant further reduction in the supplies let into Gaza.
Perhaps more important, there is no apparent solution to the question, what next? In other words, after Israel invades, kills, destroys and takes over part or all of Gaza, what does it do?
We have been there before. We do not want to go back. Attack in order to punish and leave is one thing. Occupation is something Israel does not want. If you do not know why, ask Americans who are trying to manage Iraq and Afghanistan.
Even attack and punish has its costs, not only in international condemnation but in the Israeli soldiers who will become casualties.
There is also a fog of confusing statements about the freeing Gilad Shalit, held prisoner without even access to his rights as a combatant for Red Cross visits. Israeli politicians and generals say that he must be released, even at high cost. By "high cost" they may mean freeing Palestinians murderers in an exchange, or the casualties involved in a rescue attempt. A number of other prominent individuals, including some who call for Shalit's release, have said that certain costs are too high. In other words, Shalit may not come home.
By the same token, Israel recognizes that it may not be able to do what is necessary, or may not want to do what is necessary, in order to assure that all attacks by rockets or mortars from Gaza stop.
I have heard from several Americans that this is shameful. If America was attacked from Mexico or Canada the way Israel is attacked from Gaza, the response would be immediate and overwhelming.
Maybe. Who knows?
In any case, Israel is not America. It has no leading role in the world economy, or capacity to meet much of its needs from domestic resources. It has no preponderance of military power against all likely enemies. And it has no veto in the United Nations to protect against condemnation or sanctions.
Israel has to cope with its weakness. Its leadership has also learned from sad experience. It is easier to act heroically and attack than to end a cumbersome occupation.
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Ira Sharkansky (Emeritus)
Dept of Political Science
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
msira@mscc.huji.ac.il
Tel: +972-2-532-2725
Fax: +972-2-582-9144