Rocket and mortar attacks directed against Israeli civilians from Gaza represent, in a nutshell, the conundrum of Israeli security.
The rockets and mortars cause individual disasters, a great deal of anxiety, and some property damage; but the record is not catastrophic. From 2001 to the end of November, 2007, some 2,400 rockets and 2,500 mortars made it out of Gaza. Most of them landed in open areas, but those that did not caused 20 Israeli deaths and 583 injuries. (See http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/eng/eng_n/rocket_threat_e.htm)
By some accounts, even more rockets exploded on their way to the launch sites or landed on Palestinians; and killed or wounded more of them than Israelis.
No less important than the deaths and injuries are the anxieties associated with the constant threat of attack and the numerous cases every day when a firing triggers sirens and recorded calls over the loud speakers to seek shelter. In the most recent 18 months, more than 1,600 individuals received on site treatment for stress. Many of these cases have been more lasting than the immediate symptoms. Residents of Sderot and other settlements close to Gaza shout their frustration and fears. The military and the government does not do enough to help.
A conundrum is a problem without a solution. The conundrum here is the impossibility of ending the rocket and mortar attacks completely, without causing damage to Israel and Israelis that is likely to be greater than the losses from the rocket and mortar attacks.
The rockets and mortars are easy and cheap to make, easy to transport and fire.
Israel can allocate more resources to harden existing structures near Gaza and construct more shelters. This seems to be the preferred policy, but every attack brings forth demands for more protection. Continued efforts in Palestinian workshops to increase the range of the rockets, and efforts to smuggle more powerful weapons over the border with Egypt suggest that the cost of an adequate defense would be considerable. It also brings forth opposition from politicians who want to go on the attack rather than bunker down and therefore give some measure of legitimacy to Palestinian attacks.
Israel does attack Palestinians associated with the rocket and mortar attacks. Pilotless aircraft are in the air all the time, and often guide helicopters to attack individuals on their way to or from a launching. Small and medium sized units of ground troops, with tanks and other equipment operate in Gaza. Some stay for several days, and may leave behind more Palestinian casualties than those caused by six years of rocket and mortar attacks against Israel. They also return with numerous prisoners slated for intensive questioning with an eye to later incursions.
Since Israel withdrew Jewish settlements in Gaza and thereby removed the settlers as targets of roadside ambushes and other violence, the balance of casualties has been strongly in Israel's favor. By that measure, the disengagement has been a success. Opponents count disengagement as a failure insofar as it got Israel no credit in Palestinian politics, and is associated with continuing rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli settlements within range of Gaza. The debate is not academic. It is associated with Israel's indifference in the face of demands from Americans and others that it withdraw other settlements from the West Bank. The rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza work against further disengagements.
We often hear that the IDF is preparing for an all out assault on Gaza. We also hear that the time is not ripe, and that substantial segments of the military oppose the idea.
Perhaps 1.5 million Palestinians live in several congested settlements in Gaza. The whole area is 25 miles long and 3-5 miles wide. A massive attack would cause numerous Palestinian casualties, and likely more Israeli casualties in a week or two of operations than have been caused by six years of rocket and mortar attacks.
The bottom line is, How many young Israeli men should die in order to prevent an average of 3 deaths annually from rocket and mortars? Moreover, the prevention would not be complete. Once Israeli forces left Gaza, the easy to assemble and move weapons could again begin to fly toward Israeli settlements.
If Israeli forces remained as an occupying army, they would expose themselves to continued attacks, and in all likelihood be unable to prevent all rocket and mortar attacks against Israeli settlements. For this reason, the IDF prefers small operations that move around within Gaza and do not remain there for more than a few days. Several of these operations have not only caused numerous Palestinian casualties, but have returned to Israel intact with no deaths or injuries. Generally speaking, a well trained army does more damage, and suffers fewer losses than gangs that are long on courage and enthusiasm, but short on training and equipment.
Israel is not burdened by American frustrations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is due largely to Israeli operations in Gaza (and the West Bank) being close to home. The IDF can go in and out; do its job and not remain to become a target. One of my personal war stories as an IDF reservist is leaving home in Jerusalem after an early breakfast, driving to the Lebanese border, going over in a military vehicle, doing my job, and returning home in time for a late dinner.
Could the Israeli air force or artillery stop rocket and mortar attacks from Gaza?
They could do a lot of damage in a short period of time, with few if any Israeli losses. If pushed, perhaps by a missile that landed on a kindergarten and killed a dozen toddlers, the IDF could operate like it did in Lebanon last year: give residents a few hours to evacuate a target zone, and then destroy whatever structures had been giving refuge to the groups firing the rockets.
It would not take long for foreign governments, international and Israeli humanitarians to call foul on account of "disproportionate response." The Lebanese living in the south of their country could flee north in response to the Israeli attack in 2006, and residents of Hizbollah neighborhoods of Beirut could go elsewhere. There is not much place in Gaza for the residents to flee. Attacks like those on southern Lebanon and Beirut would quickly leave a sizable portion of the residents homeless. It is doubtful that Egypt would accept them as refugees, and even more doubtful that Israel would grant them sanctuary across its borders.
Currently it seems unlikely that there will be a massive Israeli attack on Gaza. But that unlikelihood depends on the politicians of the Israeli government. The pressure from Sderot and other communities near Gaza is intense. It can become unbearable with a spurt of casualties, especially children. If that occurs, the people of Gaza will want to flee, but have no place to go.